In view of its global implications on the very quality of human life, the problem of drug abuse has a recognized, intermittent potential for scandal. Thus, the Dangerous Drugs Board conducted a survey among 218 police officers, of which 27 admitted to the use of shabu, marijuana, and narcotic cough syrups. Thereafter, the results were touted as proof that 12.3 percent of the country’s anti-narcotics police officers are allegedly addicted to drugs.This kind of literature in a hurry needs to be taken with a grain of salt. The figures are a result of answers supplied by the police officers themselves, who were responding to questionnaires. Thus, those familiar with the techniques of survey questionnaires would immediately inquire as to what the question was. It may well be that the question was not whether the policeman was a drug addict, but whether he had ever made an attempt to try out a dangerous drug.
This kind of prudence is not always available to the media, because of the pressure of time deadlines. But it is exactly this kind of prudence and circumspection that is expected of the Philippine Senate.
Having said that, nonetheless I am constrained to expose the potential for scandal of another aspect of the problem of drug abuse among policemen. I refer to the mandatory drug testing program of the Philippine National Police, under DILG Mmemorandum Circular No. 99-31, taken together with the memorandum from the office of the DILG Secretary dated 1 March 1999.
There is an outcry among the general public for mandatory drug testing on all policemen. There is already one. The program is not conducted by the PNP, but by a private company. This company has been awarded a monopoly of a business that, in the span of the six-year period of the contract, will involve the sum of P3.6 billion.
The contract, known as a Memorandum of Agreement, was signed on 29 March 1999 by the following public officials: Ronaldo Puno, as approving authority, in his capacity as undersecretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government; Roberto Lastimoso, as the signing authority, in his capacity as PNP chief; and Antonio Neri, as witness, in his capacity as assistant executive secretary in the Office of the President.
The contract is also signed for the private party by Dr. Carlito Cubelo, described as chief executive officer of Mahogany Medical and Pharmaceutical, Inc., which I shall refer to as Mahogany. The firm gives its office address as: BDL Building, Tamaraw Court St. corner President Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Under the contract, Mahogany will conduct a drug testing program for all licensed gun owners, private security guards, and law enforcement personnel. It appears from the latest statistics that there are some 639,097 licensed gun owners (as of 31 March 1999); some 227,512 private security guards (as of December 1998); and some 107,743 policemen (as of 30 April 1999). In round figures, the target population of the drug testing program consists of some one million subject persons.
Each one of these one million persons is required to pay P300 for a compulsory drug test. However, the drug testing clearance that Mahogany shall issue shall be valid only for six months; therefore, each subject will have to take the drug test twice a year. Furthermore, the contract provides for a period of six years. Thus, on this basis, the contract involves the total sum of P3.6 billion, under a monopoly awarded to the extremely fortunate Mahogany.
For a private firm, a P3.6 billion contract could well be the mega-deal of the millennium. Lucky Mahogany; but are the Filipino people lucky too? I respectfully submit that, contrary to its own self-pronouncement, the contract is not “advantageous to the government;” in fact, it is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
As such, it apparently violates Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, section 3 paragraph (g) which provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
In its present form, the contract is virtually a repudiation from beginning to end of the original project proposal submitted by Mahogany in 1996. At that time, Mahogany identified itself as a business partner of two other firms: Diagnostic Specialties, Inc., Metuchan, New Jersey, USA; and Aspanet Resources, Inc.
The remarkable contract appears to have a long history. It appears that from the very beginning, Mahogany conceptualized the drug testing program as a monopoly for itself. It succeeded. In 1996, the PNP entered into a contract with Mahogany to conduct a mandatory drug screening program, under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme.
For some reason, on 19 August 1997, then PNP chief Recaredo Sarmiento II issued what amounts to a notice of public bidding. The Sarmiento notice to the public states that Mahogany submitted to the PNP a project proposal for a compulsory drug testing program, under a build-operate-transfer scheme. As I will show later, the ______ project proposal bears hardly any recognizable similarity to the final contract as signed by Mahogany.
In any event, on 2 March 1998, the contract was apparently awarded to another business firm called ANV Enterprise and Philippine Drug Screening Laboratories. This problem was solved when Mahogany was able to convince ANV to sign a memorandum of understanding, under which both business firms agreed to jointly conduct pilot drug testing, during the pre-implementation phase of the national drug screening program.
Thereafter, Mahogany conducted a remarkably singleminded pursuit of the fat government contract. Records show that Mahogany, through Dr. Cubelo, bombarded the PNP with letters, dated 3 April, 13 May, and 20 May 1998. It appears that top brass of the PNP proved to be susceptible to the Mahogany letters, as evidenced by official PNP memoranda dated 14 April, 5 May, and 13 May 1998, all dealing with the proposed contract.
All of these determined efforts bore fruit on 10 June 1998, when Mahogany was authorized to conduct pilot drug testing, purportedly in implementation of the national drug screening program. A national drug screening program negotiations committee was also created. This was done under a memorandum signed by Miguel Coronel, police chief superintendent, and approved by the PNP chief.
Despite the features of the contract which are onerous to the government and one-sided in favor of Mahogany, on 19 March 1999 it was recommended for approval in a memorandum by Rodolfo Vejano, PNP deputy director for legal service.
As already pointed out, the final contract was signed about a year later, on 29 March 1999.
The terms of the original project proposal were apparently set out in what appears to be a notice of public bidding, or an invitation to submit comparative proposals, signed on 19 August 1997 by Recaredo Sarmiento II, then PNP chief. Thus, to prove the anomalous features of the present Mahogany contract, the most convenient method is to compare it with the original project proposal, as follows:
1. The original project proposal was for a build-operate-transfer scheme, obviously so that PNP would be able to administer compulsory drug testing by itself, without paying a business firm to do so. But the present contract does not include a BOT feature, thus rendering the PNP permanently dependent on a business firm which is dedicated to the pursuit of corporate profit, at the expense of the policemen, security guards, and gun owners.
2. The original project proposal was that the total estimated project cost would be P176 million. The present contract, although it purposely does not say so, has a total project cost of P3.6 billion.
3. The original project proposal was that Mahogany would construct 15 drug testing centers throughout the country, consisting of one center at Camp Crame, and 14 in other areas. Mahogany never constructed the centers; it simply moved into already existing government buildings.
The contract states that Mahogany “shall provide all the materials, equipments, facilities, and personnel to implement the project.” Yet, Mahogany occupies space in a government building inside Camp Crame; and presumably occupies space in similar government buildings inside 15 other regional police headquarters in various parts of the country. In doing so, apparently Mahogany uses not only government building space, but also consumes government-paid electricity and water. It appears that Mahogany does not pay either lease, electric or water bills to the PNP.
4. The original project proposal was that Mahogany would build and manage databases for the storage, retrieval, and dissemination of drug test results. I do not know if Mahogany has built such databases; I will make a presumption in favor of Mahogany that it did so. What is supported by the record is that in 1998, Mahogany was authorized to conduct pilot drug tesrting, ostensibly in preparation for the implementation of the BOT national drug screening program. That pilot drug testing was obviously a failure. If not, why does the Associated Press claim that 12.3 percent of the country’s anti-narcotics police officers are drug addicts? If this is so, then this would prove that Mahogany’s data bases is a failure.
5. The original requirement was for a revenue-sharing arrangement between Mahogany and PNP. The present contract contains no such revenue-sharing arrangement. All the profits go to Mahogany. It does not even pay the government for its office space and power consumption. In effect, the PNP subsidized Mahogany.
In conclusion, it appears that a private business firm has been given a monopoly to administer compulsory drug tests for some one million subject persons, involving a projected cost of P3.6 billion over six years. It appears that this firm, Mahogany, was itself the proponent of drug testing program which it proposed as early as 1996, and which it pursued singlemindedly until the contract was signed. This was signed at the end of March 1999. While the sheer determination of Mahogany executives to corner the contract might deserve a gasp of grudging admiration, nonetheless the contract speaks for itself: it is grossly disadvantageous to the government.Hence, I respectfully move that this speech, together with the Memorandum of Agreement dated 29 March 1999 between the PNP and Mahogany, and supporting documents, should be referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee for an inquiry in aid of legislation. As an integral part of this motion, I propose that the following should be asked to explain their participation in this onerous, one-sided contract:
1. Dr. Carlito Cubelo, as chief executive officer of Mahogany Medical and Phamaceutical Supplies, Inc.;
2. DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno;
3. PNP Chief Roberto Lastimoso;
4. Atty. Rodolfo Bejano, police superintendent and PNP deputy director for
legal service as of 19 March 1999;5. Miguel Coronel, police chief superintendent and PNP director for operations
as of 24 June 1998;6. Recaredo Sarmiento II, PNP chief as of 19 August 1997.
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The Isulong Team: Isulong SEOPh, Isulong Seoph by Benj, Pinoy Isulong by Seoph Martinez and Useless Isulong